

2660-75

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

GAC

[Redacted]

25X1

National Intelligence Officers

23 December 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Galvin's Meetings with NIO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975

1. At the invitation of Mr. Carver, Mr. Robert W. Galvin* spent the bulk of the day, Monday, 22 December 1975, at CIA Headquarters to receive briefings and engage in discussions in connection with the PFIAB's concerns about the NIEs on Soviet strategic forces. He was accompanied by Commander Lionel Olmer who is an assistant to Mr. Wheaton Byers, the Executive Secretary of the PFIAB.

Morning Session

(Attended by Messrs. Carver, Stoertz, DeBruler and [Redacted])

25X1

2. The two-hour morning session, held in Mr. Carver's office, began with a briefing by Mr. Carver on the NIOs and their functions in comparison to the defunct Board and Office of National Estimates. Mr. Carver pointed out that the NIOs made the necessary "diplomatic arrangements" to get the best talent available in the intelligence community for the preparation of NIEs. The NIO for Strategic Programs, Mr. Stoertz, was described as a unique NIO in several respects: he is the only NIO with two assistants because his concurrent service as senior intelligence advisor to the SALT delegation requires his presence in Geneva for lengthy periods; and his account is the most complex, structured, and formalized of all. Mr. Galvin, who said he was making his visit in a spirit of cooperation and communication, asked for, and was provided with, some short briefing papers on the identity of all of the other NIOs and their responsibilities.

* Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Motorola, Incorporated; Director of Harris Trust and Savings Bank; Director and past President of the Electronic Industries Association; and former member of the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment.

MORI/CDF

25X1

25X1

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Galvin's Meetings with NIO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975

3. Mr. Stoertz discussed the work of the NIO/SP and the annual "cycle" of intelligence production on Soviet strategic forces beginning with the intelligence research program and culminating with the issuance of NIE 11-3/8. The program was described as "ponderous" and the consumer's name was said to be "legion." For the NIE, intelligence "teams" were established to prepare individual sections; annexes were also prepared for special problems that may not have received attention in the intelligence research program. For example, this year the NIE had an annex on Soviet ICBM accuracy because it was thought by some that the 1974 NIE left this problem in an unsatisfactory way, despite the finding in that NIE that US Minuteman ICBMs faced an increasing threat. Mr. Galvin commented to Commander Olmer that he wanted to go back to the NIE and zero in on the paragraphs containing that judgment so Foster and the rest of PFIAB could focus on them.

4. Concerning NIO/SP-sponsored studies of "specialized" subjects, Mr. Galvin expressed interest in the findings of NSSM 242 on Soviet and Chinese reactions to the US policy of flexible uses of nuclear weapons. He said his questions about what was on the minds of the Soviets and Chinese was his way of letting the NIO know what was on the minds of certain PFIAB members. He wondered whether or not there should be more paragraphs in the NIE 11-3/8 on Soviet thinking and if these could be drawn from other, more detailed studies. Mr. Carver pointed out that this material already was contained in other NIEs such as the one covering the Soviet assessment of the US (NIE 11-5). He said that Mr. Galvin, in effect, was raising the issue of an "omnibus estimate" which he had to think more about, but which would amount to an "enormous" undertaking. Mr. Stoertz said his slant on this perceived need was to take on an "omnibus research program" as suggested by the list of published reports in the NIE 11-3/8-75, which he pointed out. He nonetheless felt strongly that NIE 11-3/8 should be self-contained. Mr. Galvin suggested that this year the PFIAB could help by providing intelligence with "supplementary" key questions and "burning issues" in connection with Soviet intentions, for example.

5. Mr. Stoertz outlined the present NIE process in comparison to earlier arrangements and noted that it now ensured that views held by anyone of the Community's analytical groups were taken into consideration early in the game. Ranges of uncertainty in estimates were discussed and certain factors were said to be not susceptible to quantitative analysis such as the effect of wind on the accuracy of ICBMs. In the end, it was most important that the NIE illuminate options available to the adversary so that US leaders could take actions to offset or effect these either through negotiation or unilateral action.

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Galvin's Meetings with NIO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975

6. Mr. Galvin then emphasized that he will be looking into the matter of how the decisionmaker actually uses the NIE. He said he would like to ask the President this question directly; in the meantime, it was his feeling that the President used the NIE as a "frame of reference" to do his work and that it was quite possible that the NIE was as good now as it ever would be. Fragmentary evidence to date indicated to him that each user saw the issues through his own eyes anyway. Mr. Carver pointed out that there were problems of the "abstract" audience, and difficulties in getting feedback.

7. In connection with seeing a "few senior customers" in the future, Mr. Galvin would be asking whether or not there would be any value to them of putting a "limitless" time frame on the key judgments in the NIE. He asked if there would be any point in using this "infinity factor" on certain subjects. He explained his question with a scenario: if the Soviets continue to spend more than we are spending on strategic programs, it seems quite reasonable that sometime--maybe after the ten-year period covered in the NIE--they will accomplish a "superiority" that they would perceive as giving them the capability to launch a first strike against the US. Mr. Stoertz said that rather than pushing the estimates to 1990 or 1995, he would favor better illustration of trends by combining the two separate tables depicting past and future Soviet forces. Mr. Carver commented that looking beyond a decade or two involved too many interacting imponderables, e.g., the kind and composition of future Soviet and US governments. Furthermore, there was the question of whether or not the Soviets were right if they ever were to have a perception that they possessed a first strike capability.

8. Mr. Galvin had an "imperfect" analogue: some smart people in his company evaluate the plans for servicing its markets and project negative cash flows for each year to 1985 which, they say, the company can "live with." If negative balance sheets in fact are produced as the years pass, somebody will finally conclude, "let's stop this" because the company, sometime in the future, will not be able to accept negative cash flows. Mr. Galvin felt that the President was competent to come to that judgment concerning the strategic situation, because if the Soviets were putting more effort into their programs, it would be clear that they would be getting more out of it. In any case, Mr. Galvin concluded that at some point intelligence would have to tell the PFIAB if the "limitless" time frame could be addressed in the NIE in practical terms. The morning session

25X1

-4-

25X1

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Galvin's Meetings with NIO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975

was concluded with the injection, By Mr. Galvin, of a "modest degree of cynicism" concerning what the user wanted intelligence to produce. He said he would like to know the extent of the influence of the user on the "system."

Afternoon Session

25X1 Held in the NIO Conference Room and attended by Messrs. Carver, Stoertz,
DeBruler, 25X1

25X1 9. During the three-hour afternoon session, Mr. Galvin received a number of briefings on developments in Soviet strategic forces which were followed by a discussion of the PFIAB-proposed study of the "track record" of the NIEs. Mr. Stoertz explained that the briefings were somewhat like those given to the USIB as part of its consideration of the draft of NIE 11-3/8-75. 25X1 began with a presentation on Soviet air defenses of which Mr. Galvin said he understood "a very substantial part." He then raised the matter of whether or not intelligence was familiar with related developments in US industry which were being accomplished on behalf of the US military. 25X1 said that this was not a great problem, but that the situation was uneven. Mr. Galvin said he would check into having people in his company meet directly with intelligence as a "test case" of the system.

25X1 10. then briefed the problem of the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs about which he noted there were no disagreements within the Intelligence Community (during this presentation, Mr. Colby briefly entered the room to extend his greetings to Mr. Galvin). Mr. Galvin said the presentation was impressive to a layman. Commander Olmer reassured him that its message came through to the full PFIAB.

25X1 11. After his presentation on future Soviet forces and interactive analysis, Mr. Galvin asked who it was that injected the "what if's" into the future force models. 25X1 replied that the models represented an informal consensus of the participants which was struck at the beginning of the NIE 11-3/8-75 process. Mr. Stoertz expanded by noting that he personally had queried the NSC staff about the utility of the kinds of force alternatives to be explored by intelligence. The latter also 25X1 selected a couple of alternatives and the DIA requested one--that having to do with the least-threatening Soviet posture. In general, commented that the interactive analysis of intelligence used only standard planning scenarios and it was not intended to predict the outcome of a nuclear war. Mr. Stoertz said a "purely intelligence" document dealing

25X1

-5-

25X1

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Galvin's Meetings with NIO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975

only with Soviet forces would be "very sterile." Mr. Galvin commented that this entire case had never been made as emphatically as it had in this discussion and he questioned whether anyone on the PFIAB, but Dr. Foster, understood it. Commander Olmer said there was "logistic confusion" about what the PFIAB wanted to say about this matter in its 8 August letter to the President. He said the PFIAB always had understood the need for intelligence to do interactive analysis; the Board only questioned whether intelligence was able to do it.

12. There followed a briefing by [] on the results of a post mortem on NIE 11-3/8-75. Several specific areas for greater attention were mentioned including Soviet ASW which, [] said, depended on our understanding of US R&D. The latter subject prompted Mr. Galvin to ask about the trailing of US submarines by the Soviets,* and whether there was a special NIE on this topic. Messrs. [] and Stoertz explained that the Soviets had a long way to go to be able to accomplish trailing partly because of the noisiness of their submarines. Mr. Galvin was told that this subject was treated in detail in a forthcoming interagency intelligence memorandum on Soviet approaches to ASW. 25X1

13. Mr. Stoertz asked Mr. Galvin if he would provide some of his thinking about the NIE "track record" project PFIAB was proposing (see PFIAB letter to D/DCI/NIO, 11 December 1975). Mr. Galvin said the project was thought to be of value because members of the PFIAB and "some users" (not identified) had the "impression" that there was a rather consistent under-estimation of Soviet strategic capabilities in each successive NIE. If this indeed were the case, this situation ought to be "unmasked;" if not, we should get it behind us. The project should involve an evaluation of the NIEs in terms of two classes of issues: quantitative and qualitative. In any case, nothing that gives balance to the evaluation should be disqualified; and the PFIAB does not intend to have this project completed unless it will be of value to intelligence. Mr. Stoertz summarized, with Mr. Galvin's assent, that the project should be a look at the quantity, quality, and timing of the various Soviet weapon systems in relation to the viability of the "triad" of US strategic offensive forces. It would be performed by a group composed

* This subject apparently was a matter of special concern to Mr. Galvin; he had asked a similar question about it during [] presentation, the context of which did not suit a comprehensive reply.

25X1

25X1

25X1

-6-

25X1

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Galvin's Meetings with NIO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975

25X1

of three or four people to include a former NIO for Special Activities [] 25X1
[] a former CIA/OSR Executive Officer (Mr. Hewitt), and perhaps
Commander Olmer as the completely "uninvolved, unprejudiced party." The
group should present their opinion about why intelligence was over or under
the mark where it is found to have been either. Commander Olmer emphasized
this part of the project as something Dr. Foster strongly desired. Mr.
Galvin said a first draft of the paper should be ready before the meeting
of the PFIAB during the first week of February 1976.

14. In closing the session, Mr. Carver said he would like the PFIAB
to devote a part of one of its meetings in the near future to intelligence
collection resources, i.e., (a) to a consideration of the potential "take"
of future intelligence collection systems and (b) to the activities of the
NIO/SA, []. Since the PFIAB had some "speed up" on these
matters, Mr. Galvin said the entire PFIAB should be involved; Commander
Olmer commented that such a discussion would be "right up our alley."

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

-7-

SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Galvin's Meetings with NIO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975

25X1

Distribution:



25X1

NIO/SP [] 5721 (23Dec75)

25X1

25X1